page 1088 Banks's "premature" departure from Grand Ecore as the reason for the loss of the important gunboat, he would need—for consistency's sake and to deflect blame—to refer to this again and again during the investigations. Whitey Smith and his command were also still upset with Banks and blamed him for the troubles Porter encountered.   Smith's second in command, Thomas Kilby Smith, wrote to Porter on arrival in Alexandria: "General Smith and I both protest at being hurried away.    I feel as if we were shamefully deserting you.    If I had the power I would march my troops back to Calhoun, or wherever you might need us, if at all."135    In the previous year, Kilby Smith had described Grant and Banks to his mother as the two "brilliant examples" before the nation.136    To place these remarks in fuller perspective, Kilby Smith tended to see the best in everyone and was quite star-struck, almost Pollyannaish, in his relations with important people.    When Kilby Smith wrote his wife from Alexandria after the failed expedition to Shreveport, he did not even mention Banks.   But he described Porter, who was sitting by his side, as a "noble fellow, game as a pheasant."    In similar letters he described Whitey Smith as a gallant old man and as "a perfect trump."137     The younger General Smith was much the opposite of the older General Smith in personality. While upriver, Whitey Smith had been making concrete arrangements to leave the Red River before Banks ordered these stopped.    On April 26, Smith started a new conflict with Banks by telling a Wisconsin reporter that it was Banks and his army who were going to leave Alexandria, but he and the 16th Corps would remain with the fleet.138     In this time period, a correspondent for the Chicago Tribune also quoted Smith as saying that he intended to stay with the gunboats though Banks and his army were leaving for New Orleans.139    It cannot be definitively ruled out that Banks intended to leave the fleet at Alexandria, but none of the orders issued in the first week back at Alexandria were consistent with such a scenario.140 In contrast to all this, Banks wrote Assistant War Secretary Dana shortly 135. Apr. 25, 1864, OR, I, 34, pt. III: 279. 136. T. K. Smith to his mother, Aug. 26, 1863, listed in Smith, Life and Letters of Thomas Kilby Smith, p. 331. 137. T. K. Smith to his mother, Mar. 9, 1864, to his wife, Apr. 29, 1864 listed in Smith, Ibid., pp. 356, 363. 138. Daily Wisconsin, May 10, 1864. 139. Chicago Tribune, May 7, 1864. 140. On April 26, he ordered some officers to come op to Alexandria.  On April 28, he wanted additional boats to keep the lower river open.  On April 28, he assigned the units to their positions in the defenses of Alexandria.   On the 29th, he ordered construction of the dam. (OR, I, 34, pt. III: 294-95, 316, 317, 333.)

page 1089 after arriving at Alexandria that he intended to protect the fleet: "The possession of the Mississippi River and the protection of its mouth from the invasion of domestic or foreign enemies is greatly dependent upon the preservation of this fleet,” he argued.    “The army is therefore compelled to hold this port until further developments.”141 In his 1887 Naval History, the admiral revealed that Whitey Smith proposed at Alexandria that Banks should be arrested, replacing him with General Franklin.   Porter claimed he talked Smith out of the idea, but Porter's tendency to embellish may mean that Smith was only engaged in his usual grumbling.142     This also may be just another one of Porter's garbled versions of a similar episode, with Smith proposing the mutiny to Franklin back at Pleasant Hill. In Alexandria, this internecine feud among the Federal commanders did not prevent Smith and Mower from accepting an invitation from Banks to help dispose of a magnificent banquet and champagne sent up by a French restaurant in New Orleans.143    These might be the "goodies" sent up by successful cotton speculator Charles A. Weed.144 In Alexandria also, the quartermaster became aware soon after the army left Grand Ecore that he would not be sending supplies upriver again.    On April 23, he moved eleven steamers below the falls.   That made twenty-six below the falls, and apparently he soon had the remaining thirteen below the falls.   They were never mentioned as being above the falls after then.145   Banks was desirous of downriver protection for the boats, and he seemingly did not think Porter could handle the situation.   On April 29, he wrote to Admiral Farragut, reporting the army was in excellent condition, but he said more boats were needed to keep the lower Red River open.   Farragut had no jurisdiction over these inland waters any more, and the request for assistance should have come through Porter.146 Soon after arriving at Alexandria, the periodic muster of the army troops took place.   The Red River expedition had 39,041 soldiers present for duty 141. Banks to Dana, Apr. 30, 1864, Charles A. Dana papers, LOC.  Banks used the occasion of explaining his firing of a drunken general to provide a justification of his recent decisions and to paint a positive picture of the army's present condition.   He probably thought correctly that it would be a waste of time to write directly to Stanton or Halleck with explanations. 142. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War, p. 524. 143. Homans, "The Red River Expedition," Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. VIII, p. 89. 144. Holabird to Banks, Aug. 21, 1866, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 38. 145. OR, I, 34, pt. III: 268. 146. Banks to Farragut, Apr. 29, 1864, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 32.

page 1090 with eighty pieces of artillery—far more than the 8,000 men Taylor could sometimes muster.147   Taylor's ruses continued to have all the generals, including the very able General Mower, still assuming that all the much larger forces of the Trans-Mississippi were nearby.   Taylor hoped to maintain the deception longer by "sending drummers to beat calls, lighting camp-fires, blowing bugles, and rolling empty wagons over fence rails."148    It was also the first time during the war that the Confederates completely hoodwinked Colonel John Clark's intelligence system.    In the Federal records during the May occupation of Alexandria, there were references to spies and scouts, but the information they provided was apparently flawed in the extreme.149 The examination of prisoners from the 19th Texas Cavalry Regiment in early May had provided information about their cavalry brigade, but the overall intelligence on May 5 provided by General Emory clearly indicated they did not know where the Rebel infantry divisions were operating.    There were even false rumors that one Confederate division had captured Little Rock, Arkansas.150 The only exception to the intelligence failure seemed to be that from a Mr. O. L. Taylor.    Presuming his postwar account was correct, he then provided Banks in Alexandria with the information that the Confederate strength in the area was significantly smaller than thought.151 147. OR, I, 34, pt. I: 168. 148. OR, I, 34, pt. I: 590-1. 149. May correspondence, Natl. Archives, RG 393, pt. I, entry 1738, Dept. Gulf, Letters Sent. 150. Emory letter, May 5, 1864, Natl. Archives, RG 393, pt. I, entry 1756, Dept. Gulf, Letters Received, box 8. 151. Taylor to Banks, Feb. 18, 1868, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 41.  Since Taylor did not ask for any favors in his later letter to Congressman Banks, his story may be credible.

Take Me to List of Pages/Chapters Previous Pages Next Pages Bibliography