CHAPTER 17
Chasing Stonewall in the Shenandoah
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page 318 Shields and himself (Rosecrans).83 Stanton had also recently told General McDowell to "make no movement" and to consider his mission as primarily that of protecting the capital.85 Yet McDowell was now being mentioned as participating in a joint movement. The telegraph wires were soon sizzling with an order to General Frémont to explain "immediately" what conference or understanding he had with Banks respecting combined movements.86 Stanton would have to worry perhaps whether there was a military coup at work. Banks had even written that he and Rosecrans were in full agreement. Probably with some relief, the secretary
received Frémont's reply which stated he and Banks had only agreed to keep
each other informed. Frémont had even halted his movement, he said,
waiting for Blenker's division to arrive. Only when Blenker was
present would he communicate his plans to Banks.87 In a follow-up letter to Stanton on
April 18, Rosecrans explained the details of what he meant in his prior
unsettling message. All the movements of the commanders, as listed
by Rosecrans in this new reply, did describe actual operations. But
he also indicated he thought McDowell was moving south to the James
River.88 Within hours, Stanton
telegraphed back: "The President will not sanction the plan you
propose..."89 They ordered Rosecrans
back to Washington. En route, Rosecrans replied further that this
was just the plan of Banks and Shields, and General McDowell "probably"
would have gone along with it.90 Rosecrans had obviously gone too
far. Despite this, the
83. Rosecrans to Stanton, Apr. 17, 1862, OR, I, 12, pt.
III: 87. |
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page 319 correspondence confirms Banks—as he prepared to move father south toward Harrisonburg—was unaware that McDowell’s men were not similarly moving in that direction. The Confederate war department had no objections to Jackson taking his men eastward straight to Swift Run Gap. Jackson once again designated Ashby to slow any movement by the Federals.91 The rate at which supplies became available would dictate the rate of the Federal advance. The bluecoats were only several days from Jackson and Swift Run Gap. On the 19th, the day Jackson arrived at his new camp, Banks took a force to the east, up the winding mountain road along the gap and down into the Luray Valley. It is unknown if this foray had anything to do with a letter General Alpheus Williams wrote that day. Williams had been looking past his gigantic mustache at the recent newspapers that had arrived. He had earlier celebrated the victories at New Orleans and Fort Donelson with a bottle of whiskey.92 But now the news was bad. Like the readers in Washington, he observed that the horrific events recently at Shiloh, Tennessee, were related to a failure to detect a secret movement of the Confederates. Williams, whose troops had not been used in the vanguard so far and who was not listed as a party to the recent Rosecrans-Shields-Banks agreement, now suggested Banks use caution when in front of the enemy.93 The tentative Williams seemed the obverse of Banks's other division commander, the sometimes reckless Shields. Shields felt that with a big push, "we will be the first in Richmond and ought to be."94 Since Banks's command did not seem a sure route to participating in important activities, Shields tried to cover his bases by writing directly to Secretary Stanton. According to Shields's version of events he "assisted" in conducting the recent key operation against Jackson at Mount Jackson that drove him from the valley. Now that the valley only needed a garrison, the troops up on the northern edge of Virginia should all be united under one commander and force their way toward Richmond. Shields said he was ready to take the leadership of that force now that his wounds had healed. He could begin this after the secretary obtained a major general's commission for him
91. In one of those strange quirks of history, Stonewall had
spent one of the nights on the road at the ancestral home of the Abraham
Lincoln family at Big Spring. (McDonald, Make Me a Map of the Valley:
The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson's Topographer, p. 24, entry
of April 17. ) |
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page 320 from the U.S. Senate.95 Shields said General Williams could handle the occupation of the valley. There was also a glaring omission in this letter—no mention of any role for Banks in future campaigns. When Shields indicated he "assisted" in the attack on Mount Jackson, he had actually assisted as little or as much as he had done at Kernstown. He had been in the rear area all this period at Strasburg, then Woodstock, though he had technically resumed command of his division. It cannot be ruled out that Banks had placed him in the rear so he would not have to deal with him. The letter to Stanton also coincided with some forward moves taking place toward Harrisonburg during which Shields's entire division was left in the rear area, and Williams's men moved to the front. In a reversal of his advice two days earlier for a big push, Shields now wanted Banks not to proceed with this movement up the valley at all because it left the rear area too unprotected, he said.96 Despite all the bravado and activity implied in Shields's letter, he was physically unable to take minimum control of his division in the field until the 30th, ten days after he wrote the Stanton letter.97 Even a month later he would write Secretary Seward that his arm was still not improved enough for him to ride a horse.98 Shields did not receive a reply from Stanton who was not yet interested in a forward movement to Richmond, and on April 25 Stanton wrote Banks that "every one is pleased with the activity and cautious vigor of your command...We take it for granted that your column is not pushed too far in advance of your support, so as to receive a surprise or sudden blow [á la Shiloh?]..."99 The lack of response did not mean Stanton was hostile to Shields. After Kernstown, Washington still considered Shields one of the more promising generals. The war department did not know he was in bed during the battle there. Lincoln knew much more about Shields than Stanton did. The former senator had challenged the president to a duel once in Illinois, and Lincoln disposed of that challenge by designating broadswords as the weapons, as has been mentioned. The short-armed Shields decided then not to take on
95. Shields to Stanton, Apr. 20, 1862, OR, I, 12, pt.
III: 94. The U. S. Senate eventually rejected such a promotion for
Shields. |
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page 321 the lanky Lincoln. So Lincoln already had taken the measure of Shields in his earlier dealings. In the valley, Banks was confronted with a number of reports that General Jackson had arrested Unionist civilians in Winchester and had taken them with him when he left. Some were elderly persons. On April 10, Banks wrote Jackson saying he was violating the laws of war, and he wanted these people released.100 Jackson does not seem to have replied. It is unknown if these arrests actually occurred or were misinterpreted as such. Topographer Strother was told stories of these arrests when he arrived in Winchester in March. McDowell also reported civilians under arrest and taken from Fredericksburg in this period.101 Another concern pertained to persons of color in the area. There do not seem to be any credible charges that Banks returned any runaway slaves. Although there had been varied responses to runaways in 1861, by 1862 there were few complaints of officers returning slaves. This was especially not a problem in the valley because there was a great need for laborers to rebuild the railroads and to load supplies up near the Potomac. They would also find a place as teamsters for the supply wagons. Driving mule teams required experience which few soldiers from the New England and Great Lakes area possessed. Black laborers in Virginia with such experience were available in abundance. Banks, Williams, Stone, Dwight and other senior officers in this department were not then abolitionists. This does not mean they admired slavery. The course of the war would radicalize many of the Union participants, but in 1862 there seemed to be hesitancy to make full use of African Americans. Even Congress had passed by votes of 117 to two and thirty to five the Crittenden resolution in July 1861, which stated that there was no intention to interfere with the established institutions of the rebellious states.102 One of the factors in the early war was a desire not to alienate the slave-owning areas of the Union, such as Kentucky and Maryland and eastern Tennessee. Williams was particularly disappointed that African Americans in the upper valley did not provide more assistance to them. He wrote home: "If the abolitionists could see things as they really are here they would have less confidence in the aid the Negro is in concluding the war."103 Perhaps the failure of blacks to respond to
100. OR, II, 3: 438. |
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page 322 the poorly conceived John Brown invasion in 1859 was in the national memory, but black recruits would rally to the Union cause by the end of the war.104 Part of the anger with abolitionists among these officers was also related to the fact that many of the most ardent abolitionists were Quaker pacifists who would not be fighting in the war. In the Deep South, slave refugees would flood into Union army areas, but the Shenandoah Valley did not have a high density of slaves. In fact, there were many free blacks there, who originally had little interest in leaving their property and relatives. In the Northern states, they would face the same handicaps as imposed in Virginia so there was not a large incentive to leave. Chaplain Alonzo Quint found some resistance to leaving also among the slaves because of the ties to their families in the area.105 Major Wilder Dwight spoke of a slave woman, Aunt Chloe, who was crying because her son had run away to be free.106 Some others said that the presence of the Union troops looked promising to their future, but they were not sure how to take advantage of the situation. When the Union army left the valley in a few weeks, a significant number would decide to "take the plunge" and accompany the army. Rumor eventually spread that Stonewall intended to reenslave freed blacks, and this motivated others to go within Union lines.107 In the various entries in Banks's records, the escaped slaves seem to have provided the most exaggerated reports of the size of Confederate forces. It is possible false stories were deliberately fed to them. Soon after Jackson left New Market to go
east to Swift Run Gap, the Federals found that the road in that
direction was unobstructed. Banks wanted better confirmation of
Jackson's location and more supplies before proceeding. He asked
aide John Clark to put his scouts out to find out for sure if Jackson had
really retreated.108 A Rebel prisoner
at the same time brought incorrect
Craven, Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd, p.
150.) |
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page 323 news that General Lee had left Virginia for Tennessee with his army, as well as exaggerated estimates of troop strengths in Jackson's army and the first news ever that General Ewell had a supporting force to the east of Banks in the Luray Valley.109 The Massachusetts general once again did not seem to put much stock in prisoner information. He wrote Washington that Jackson had gone from the valley on the 18th—exactly the day he left.110 This good intelligence came from Union cavalry which entered Harrisonburg at the end of the mountain.
109. Shields to Banks, Apr. 20, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC.
box 19. |
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