CHAPTER 21
Chasing Stonewall Again
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page 388 Frémont was in Strasburg. The Potomac had been
very high and slowed the crossings. The ferry at Williamsport was
out of service for a while, and the bridge at Harpers Ferry was
temporarily swept away.34 The damage
to the ferry and bridge was not serious, and the railroad was running all
the way to Martinsburg by June 8, to Winchester by June 9, to Strasburg by
June 12, and to Mount Jackson by June 16.35 The telegraph was in operation to Front
Royal and Strasburg by the middle of June. As he moved to the south,
Banks's new evaluation was that Jackson had split up his forces when he
moved south.36 The incorrect
intelligence about Jackson's move to the southeast was apparently still
exerting some influence.
The citizens of Martinsburg were glad to see
both armies go. What the bluecoats did not steal, the butternuts
pilfered. On June 4, Banks moved his main army force farther south
toward deserted Winchester. Events up the valley would keep Banks
from advancing farther southward. This was the third time Stonewall Jackson
had outsmarted Federal armies in a matter of weeks. The general who
appeared to be a "has-been" after the Romney and Kernstown campaigns would
now be considered a legendary Confederate hero, idolized by Southerners,
feared by Northerners. The escape up the valley while pursued
by the armies of Banks, Frémont and Shields was the most spectacular of
his marches. It was also the first retreat of the war that
would truly meet Banks's description as "the most remarkable that has
occurred or will occur during the war"—which he had applied a few days
earlier to his own retrograde movement.
34. Alpheus Williams to Banks, June 4, 1862 and Miles to Banks, June 5, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 21. 35. Miles to Banks, June 8 (twice), June 12, 1862, Ibid. 36. N. P. Banks to Franz Siegel (sic), June 3, 1862, Franz Sigel papers, NY Historical Society. |
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page 389 "Jackson ...ought not to have escaped."37 Banks had received nine cheers several days earlier when he had promised his soldiers along the Potomac that not one of the Confederates would escape from the Union forces moving into Jackson's rear.38 As he moved southward, Banks had added the 10,000 men sent to Harpers Ferry to his department. As of June 1, Major General Franz Sigel took over as the divisional commander of these men.39 The short, boyish-looking, easily excitable Sigel spoke excellent English with a definite accent. Often appearing Zorro-like in a large cape and broad-brim hat, he was unmistakable, if not comical, at times. He had been minister of war in 1848 for the unsuccessful revolutionary forces in Germany, but so far had shown only mediocre generalship in the American contest. Lincoln saw to the general's commission for Sigel in order to solidify support of German Americans for the war. General Saxton at Harpers Ferry had not wanted to leave that town to follow Jackson, but his replacement, Sigel, at least had earlier shown more spunk at Pea Ridge and other sites. Shields tried to stay in the action by sending a select force up the Luray Valley to burn the bridges at the southern end of Massanutten Mountain before Jackson reached there. Stonewall anticipated this and burned those that might be used by Shields. Nature also cooperated with Jackson by providing heavy rains to swell the rivers. Frémont slowly followed Jackson down the western side of the mountain. Despite having the advantage of the best road in the area, rains plagued both armies along the turnpike, but Jackson pushed the men on to south of the mountain. The straggling that occurred along the march was unusual for Jackson's command. By June 6, Jackson reached the town of Port Republic where Frémont would be on one side of the Shenandoah and Shields on the other. On June 8, Jackson was approached by Frémont's entire force north of the town, as well as some of Shields's elite force that raided his rear area at Port Republic. Though disorganized by Shields's surprise attack, Jackson's men defeated the raiders. Frémont conducted an artillery duel with some of Jackson's men at Cross Keys, outside Port Republic. Frémont lined up his men in parade formation and moved them forward. The Confederates fired from defensive positions and soon sent the lines of bluecoats back to their
37. N. P. Banks to Mary T. Banks, June 7, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 5. 38. Entry of May 26, 1862, Jordan, The Civil War Journals of John Mead Gould, 1861-1866, p. 135. 39. OR, I, 12 pt. I: 538. His name was apparently phonetically pronounced SEE-gehl because multiple, German-speaking acquaintances, including Banks, spelled his name Siegel in correspondence. “Sigel” is a nonstandard spelling of this surname. |
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page 390 camps. The Rebels lost about 300 men, and Frémont about 600 in the fighting. Jackson soon had pioneers out constructing a bridge of wagons overnight to allow him to get to Shields's army. He was not able to get all his men across, but it was enough for him by late morning to demolish two brigades in the vanguard of Shields's army in desperate hand-to-hand fighting. Jackson lost about 800 men in this battle compared to Shields's loss of over 1,000—half missing or prisoners. Shields himself had once again not been on the field. Frémont tried to assist by bringing up his artillery to Jackson's flank during the confrontation with Shields's men, but one of the three river sections at Port Republic held back his men. The artillery was accordingly too far away to do anything beyond desultory firing and definitely did not influence the outcome. Frémont and Shields the next day were heading back down the valley, and Jackson left Port Republic to go assist General Lee's army fighting McClellan southeast of Richmond. Although Shields would command forces in the upper valley for some weeks, Lincoln was apparently tired of him and gave him no other commands. For most of the next month, Frémont would engage in a testy series of letters with Lincoln begging for reinforcements for his relatively large army. He also tried to portray his encounter with Jackson at Cross Keys as a great victory that caused Jackson to leave the area. Lincoln would have none of this though he does not seem to have confronted Frémont directly about it. The president wrote to Carl Schurz who investigated the situation within Frémont's army: "You say it is fortunate that Fremont did not intercept Jackson; that Jackson had the superior force, and would have overwhelmed him. If this is so, how happened it that Fremont fairly fought and routed him on the 8th? Or is the account that he did fight and rout him false and fabricated?"40 Banks was apparently taken in by Frémont's glowing accounts, writing the Californian: "Your movements have had a splendid success."41 The Massachusetts general may have changed his opinion of the success after conferring with a number of men with different opinions in Washington in June. Despite Frémont's bravado, his June letters show considerable lack of confidence that he could accomplish anything militarily. On June 8, orders arrived in Winchester telling Banks he was now also responsible for garrisoning Front Royal and the area just to the east of there.42 McDowell had moved his headquarters to Front Royal during the emergency, but he was now going back east to the Fredericksburg area in hopes of restarting an offensive towards Richmond. Banks’s movement took over a
40. Lincoln to Schurz, June 16, 1862, OR, I, 12, pt. III: 398. 41. Banks to Frémont, June 13, 1862, OR, I, 12, pt. I: 34. 42. OR, I, 12, pt. I: 541. |
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page 391 week because the bridges to Front Royal had washed away once again. Banks began lobbying Washington to center all the valley forces at Middletown north of Strasburg, arguing they could quickly go either into the Luray or Shenandoah Valleys or east to Bull Run.43 This idea surfaced because Frémont wanted Banks to relocate instead to Mount Jackson, which was not easily defended from the south. Lincoln would not hear of any plan that left Front Royal uncovered.44 If he could not concentrate the troops at Middletown, Banks decided the town would at least be a good place for his headquarters. General Sigel, who had recently complained about the quality of troops assigned to him, tried in the meantime to take up the banner Shields had dropped. He requested that Lincoln assign two brigades of Banks's command to him so he could "drive Jackson out of the valley."45 This would have effectively given Sigel two battle-tested brigades while leaving Banks in the rear with the recruits Sigel then commanded. Sigel learned that Lincoln did not want Banks's men moved. By June 16, Banks had a total of 17,385 men assigned to him. Geary's eastern railroad brigade was transferred yet again to a more eastern command. The two brigades under Gordon and Donnelly were now under the command of the more senior generals, Greene and Crawford, who had been in an unassigned status. Hatch still commanded the cavalry. Sigel had about 8,000 men in his two brigades of recruits.46 Because Sigel was the only other major general in Banks's command, he replaced Williams as the second in command. Banks in the meantime recommended George Gordon for a promotion to general.47 Because of Gordon’s condescending and carping attitude toward Banks, that commander may have seen the promotion as an opportunity to rid his department of a big personal headache. Since Washington had sent Brigadiers Greene and Crawford to take charge of the brigades headed by Gordon and Donnelly, a promotion for Gordon would presumably mean he would be leaving. Gordon's friend, Massachusetts Congressman Hooper, helped to get the commission approved by the Military Affairs Committee.48 The full U. S. Senate consented, and the army's adjutant general asked Banks on June 13 to give Gordon the command of his old brigade.49 Gordon explained that Banks
43. OR, I, 12, pt. I: 543. 44. OR, I, 12, pt. I: 544. 45. OR, I, 12, pt III: 395. 46. OR, I, 12, pt. III: 399. 47. Recommendation letter, May 31, 1862, George H. Gordon papers, 1842-1885, Mass. Historical Society, Microfilm P-376, reel 23. 48. Hooper to Banks, June 6, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 21. 49. Lorenzo Thomas to Banks, June 13, 1862, Ibid. |
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page 392 would not give him the command back so he went to Washington to arrange it.50 Banks's duty to accommodate Gordon is no so clear because Greene was the senior general, and there was some obligation for Washington to transfer one of them. Banks complied with the requested change on June 20. General Greene surrendered the brigade he had commanded for only a month, and someone eventually found some new regiments for him to command. This was yet another episode in the decades-long, tense Gordon-Banks relationship which would culminate in the unflattering portrayal of Banks in Gordon's histories. Gordon had also been a classmate of both the Union commander, George McClellan, and the Confederate commander, Stonewall Jackson, and it was probably humiliating to occupy a leadership position so inferior to that of his classmates. Gordon's men, at least, were happy to have him back.51 During late June, Banks became the victim of false reports of a large enemy force moving toward him at Front Royal. General Williams told him there was "little doubt" that Jackson and Ewell were in the valley, and General Crawford also reported Ewell descending the valley with a large force.52 Ewell was instead then marching with Jackson toward Richmond. What the Federals had seen was a large cavalry demonstration to cover this redeployment, combined with the dissemination of false rumors. At least there were no reports of Ashby anymore, the cavalry commander having died in fighting earlier in the month. Banks tried unsuccessfully to persuade Washington to keep Shields's division in the valley. Congressmen Hooper and Gooch undertook a begging mission to obtain more troops for Banks.53 Secretary Stanton tried to placate Banks by attaching Geary's brigade to his command yet once again.54 Frémont moved back to Strasburg, and the two commands of Banks and Frémont manned a defensive line from Front Royal on the east to Strasburg on the west. Banks privately agreed with Frémont that their command should be united, but Washington had a tin ear on this subject. Cavalry was kept well to the front in both valleys this time. Rumors were now rife that Jackson was to attempt another run down the valley to Winchester, a rumor that caused Mr. Lincoln to keep these large forces in the valleys.
50. Gordon, From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain in the War of the Great Rebellion, 1861-62. The order again assigning Gordon command of the brigade was issued June 18, 1862, as War Dept. Special Order 138. 51. Colonel Clark several months later wrote in his diary: “Apparently ‘tis impossible for him [Gordon] to obey cheerfully and promptly any order.” (Diary entry, Aug. 9, 1862, John S. S. Clark papers, Cayuga Museum of History and Art.) 52. Williams to Banks, June 22, 1862, Crawford to Banks, June 23, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 21. 53. Copeland to Banks, June 21, 1862, Ibid. 54. OR, I, 12, pt. III: 421 |
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