Crooked Run grew muddier as the day progressed, and it became a slight bottleneck for artillery pieces and heavy vehicles.  Stonewall also used up another regiment in picketing the western and northern edges of the line of march.

Upon Jackson's and Ewell's arrivals at the mountain, the Confederate cavalry was still so preoccupied in screening the Madison County area (on their west) that little penetration had been made of the Federal cavalry position in Culpeper County (on their east).  These Rebel cavalry screeners would not rejoin the main army at Cedar Mountain until nightfall.   Because of this diversion of cavalry resources, Jackson did not initially have a good estimate of how many Federals were obstructing the road ahead.  He learned, nevertheless, that the men at the mountain were part of Banks's command, leading to the usual derisive jokes about "commissary" Banks and how easily they would whip him..

As the Confederate vanguard moved up the curving road around to the northern side of the mountain at midday, some Union cavalry greeted them menacingly from a position up the road from the local schoolhouse.  General Ewell took control of the situation, bringing up Early's infantry brigade to the front where the soldiers took up mostly hidden positions.  Jackson made his headquarters at a house back of the mountain and sent word for Ewell to advance when the other division arrived.   It was 2 p.m. before Ewell had artillery at the front.  The desultory firing initially caused the green New England cavalrymen to disappear, but they soon returned and continued to block the road.  They brought with them some Union artillery this time.  A small artillery duel ensued, with little serious damage to either side.²⁵

When they approached the front line, they probably would have seen mostly ripening, green corn, acres of corn, and very little of their foe from that location. Confederate topographer Jed Hotchkiss indicated there had been clouds of dust behind the Union cavalry, suggesting large bodies of troops were behind the corn even if they were not visible.²⁷  Along this front line, the mountain base gently sloped downward toward the Federals..  Because of the downward slope and the corn, even the horsemen could not see in their front the hidden geographical depressions.  That eastern slope of the mountain which was in the possession of the Federals, was a series of small swales and folds in which large numbers of recumbent Union men could disappear.   As Banks's force gathered, the artillery on both sides lobbed shells over the corn.   The Federals also could not see much of their enemy because of the same corn.   Early in the action, the more efficient Union artillery forced Early's front

 position to pull back slightly.

During the three-hour delay much had been happening on the other side of the cornfields and up the road to Culpeper.  That town was only five to six miles from Cedar Mountain, depending on the campsite used.   This short distance meant that a marching column should have been able to arrive hurriedly in a little over an hour.  As best as can be reconstructed, Pope and staff did not issue the earliest orders to leave Culpeper until about 8 a.m.  It was then, according to Banks, that Pope ordered him to move the remainder of his corps to the front.²⁸   It will be recalled that some regiments did not arrive in Culpeper the night before until midnight.  Barring an emergency, it was desirable that the men rest.  Despite the short distance of the line of march, the day was hot, humid and lethal.  Navy Secretary Gideon Welles recorded temperatures over 100 degrees on his porch in Washington, D. C., on August 9 and 10.²⁹

One of the most controversial episodes of the war occurred at about 9:45 a.m. in Culpeper.  Pope's aide, Colonel Louis H. Marshall, arrived at Banks's headquarters to explain the commanding general's orders, according to Banks's account.³⁰   Marshall was a Northern nephew of General Robert E. Lee, but this relationship was only a historical oddity on August 9.  Banks directed the copying of Marshall's orders and reading them back to the colonel.  In making a written record, Banks perhaps had in mind what happened to General Hatch recently for not carrying out orders.  He might also have wanted cover in case these orders were not exactly as Pope had spoken them.  Banks's action would prove quite useful because General Pope would demonstrate over the next several months that he had difficulty issuing understandable orders.  Marshall's words were recorded as follows:

Several years later, Marshall wrote the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War he recalled an entirely different version of this message.  According to his best memory, he had told Banks "that you not attack the enemy unless it becomes evident the enemy will attack you; then, in order to hold the advantage of being the attacking party, you will attack with your skirmishers thrown well to the front."³²

Colonel John S. Clark, the senior aide, Major Delavan D. Perkins, chief of staff, Major Louis Henry Pelouze, the adjutant, Lieutenant William W. Rowley, acting signal officer, and others were present when Marshall delivered his message, and someone read it back to the group.  When he no longer reported to either Banks or Pope, Perkins wrote Banks in December 1862 that "Pope had told a whopper" about that message.  Perkins offered to join Pelouze in verifying that Pope ordered an attack.³³  Chaplain Alonzo Quint several years after the battle implied in a footnote commentary in his book that he was also a witness to the delivery of these verbal orders which Banks then asked to be committed to writing.³⁴

In May 1865, Major William W. Rowley also wrote Banks, indicating he heard the colonel on Pope's staff deliver this message that stated Banks was to attack at once.  Pelouze wrote it down and read it back to Banks, according to Rowley.³⁵   Pelouze was severely wounded at Cedar Mountain, and he does not seem to have commented further in public.  Banks mentioned only Pelouze in his congressional testimony, suggesting he was willing to allow Pelouze to verify the message.  Pelouze, who no longer worked for Banks, was on duty in the Washington area in late 1864 when Banks testified.³⁶

Another Pope aide, Colonel Speed Butler, a few days later—before there was any controversy—had the impression that "the whole of Genl. Banks

command was ordered forward by Genl. Pope on the morning of the 9th, with instructions to attack the enemy as soon as possible."³⁷

Pope's instructions would be a major point of discussion after the battle.  If Banks violated the written version of Marshall's orders, his one possible failure was that of not attacking Jackson "as soon as he approaches."   In court-martial testimony in early 1863 when Banks was away in New Orleans, Pope said he told Banks verbally "that if the enemy advanced to attack him that he should push his skirmishers well to the front and notify me immediately, it being, my wish to gain all the time possible to concentrate our forces at Culpeper Court-House."³⁸

In his official report that same year, Pope said he directed Banks that "if the enemy advanced to attack him in the strong position which I had instructed him to take up, he should push his skirmishers well to the front and notify me immediately."³⁹  With the added mention of the “strong position,” this was the same version.  In an official letter in 1865 to Senator Ben Wade, Pope reiterated the 1863 versions, charging that "no man could have understood it [the order] as General Banks said he did."   He also denied he had given any such order to Marshall and that two other corps were to concentrate in that strong position.⁴⁰

Marshall did write Wade that he had delivered a message.  Marshall's later version of it spoke of attacking the enemy under certain circumstances; Pope's did not.  The transcribed original, as mentioned, had spoken instead of attacking immediately on the mere approach of the enemy.

Pope also contended in 1865 that the movements to concentrate against General Jackson were "perfectly well known" to everybody in the army and his orders gave Banks no authority to move forward against Jackson.⁴¹

There are serious flaws in the logic of Pope's versions.  The skirmishers were already well to the front, and commanders do not ordinarily put skirmishers out after an enemy attacks because it is too late to do so.  There was also no way to notify Pope immediately because there was no telegraphic or signal contact between Banks and Pope's distant headquarters.

Pope must be faulted for not moving his headquarters closer to the action that day.  From the Thoroughfare Mountain area, for example, he would have

been one to two miles from most of his army in case Ewell's "large force"—as he himself then described it—decided to attack.  He would then have been able to move McDowell's center corps much quicker to the most threatened point.  Pope also made the mistake of sending too many troops to the front if he really only wanted Banks to delay the enemy as he later claimed.⁴²   If Pope had also notified Banks personally how to react to Ewell's movements, as he said, why did he send Marshall to say the same thing again, and why should Banks want to write it down if Marshall said the same thing?  One logical conclusion is that either Marshall misrepresented the orders or Pope was not willing later to admit he issued them.

Banks stopped at Pope’s tent on the way to the front.  Colonel John Clark recorded that Sigel and McDowell were also there.  Clark indicated that Pope said that McDowell’s corps would follow immediately and that he himself would be at the front by early or midafternoon.⁴³

Brigadier General Samuel Crawford, who commanded the only brigade at the front the morning of the battle, indicated he received an order from Pope "directing me to resist the advance of the enemy."⁴⁴   If Crawford was accurate and there was no order for him to fall back when overpowered, this bit of evidence also confirms Pope was willing to have a concentration of forces and a stand against Jackson down near Cedar Mountain.