page 491 command any more.  When Banks inherited the Washington garrison, it was not even known where Lee's men were or what they were doing.   Soldiers from Banks's Washington command and from his old corps would provide the key intelligence to pinpoint exactly where Lee was heading.  In turn, McClellan would upset Lee's plans and force him back to Virginia. A soldier from General Gordon's brigade discovered in a Maryland field a copy of Lee's operational plans and troop dispositions.  Someone had used the abandoned document as a cigar wrapper and carelessly discarded or lost it.   General Alpheus Williams reviewed it and passed the document on to McClellan.  Little Mac then mobilized his army to intercept Lee while Confederate forces were still divided.   This movement resulted in the battle at South Mountain, then nearby Antietam, Maryland, the latter being the bloodiest one-day battle in American history. Mansfield took Banks's old corps to the battle.  He was an engineer with no combat experience, leading a corps beefed up with new, poorly trained Pennsylvania regiments within Crawford's brigade.  A cornfield was once again the setting for the battle, this time taking place in the early morning.  Mansfield's corps suffered some of the highest number of casualties for the day.   Ignoring the casualty figures from the new regiments, the veteran infantry suffered no worse than Confederate counterparts.  This time, Jackson's men were not present at the point of conflict.   Mansfield was killed, and Alpheus Williams resumed command.   Lee afterward headed back into Virginia, his army saved by a half-hearted effort by McClellan to punish him during the retreat.  McClellan's caution led to the appointment of a new Federal field commander, but the repulse also provided the right timing for Lincoln to issue his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Clark's analyses of Confederate regimental strengths were important sources of intelligence in this period.  In his report to the chief of staff, Banks indicated Clark had obtained his figures by separately interviewing 250 prisoners, a method Banks recommended for use throughout the army.1   A McClellan topographer, John C. Babcock, had worked at identifying Confederate regiments when he was on the peninsula, and Clark may have had access to his work. McClellan's intelligence chief, the detective Allan Pinkerton, visited the White House after Antietam and suggested that Lee took 140,000 men to that battle.32  McClellan's report, without revealing his own troop strengths, also suggested the Confederates had about that many men present at the battle.33  31. Banks to Cullum, Oct. 20, 1862, OR, I, 19, pt. II: p 452. 32. Horan and Siggett, The Pinkerton Story, 1951, p. 117. 33. McClellan report, Oct. 15, 1862, OR, I, 19, pt. I: 31.  He said 200,000 men were engaged in the

page 492 Even in his letters to his wife, McClellan seemed convinced that his high numbers were correct. In this same time period, John Clark was calculating by early October that 202 regiments with an average strength of 336 effectives had gone into that battle.34   This totaled 67,872 men and was a figure quite different from the 120,000 to 140,000 used by Pinkerton and McClellan.   But the Confederates themselves in late September—before Clark's report—mentioned the size of their forces at Antietam, which was a number close to Clark's own.35     So it cannot be ruled out that Clark revised his numbers to match the Confederate newspaper reports—if such Confederate source information were available to him. General Banks forwarded a complex spy report to his superiors on October 15 in which the listed sources (incorrectly) estimated Lee's strength as being 150,000 men.   Banks said be believed the sources to be reliable, but he did not express an opinion on the data.36   This was again the high figure used by Pinkerton.  Banks ought to have had Clark's first report in hand by that date, which would have allowed him to comment on the spy report.   He apparently was hesitant to give his endorsement to just Clark's figures while ignoring all other sources. Whatever the situation, Clark's official report, which Banks now also forwarded, stated that almost 100,000 men were present for duty in Lee's entire regional army before the battle.  This was again half Pinkerton's estimates of the same organization.  The actual count was probably 25,000 less than this 100,000 total.37   Clark's remaining major deficiency in his estimating technique was the inclusion of 18,400 men who were supposedly in forty-six mystery regiments.   Most of these units likely did not exist.  Banks's explanation of the figures to his bosses also left much to be desired, as he intimated that the 100,000 men Clark listed as present before the battle represented the same figure as Lee's diminished strength afterwards.38 It is known Lincoln had come to doubt the Pinkerton-McClellan troop   battle.  He likely knew he had 75,000 Union soldiers present, leaving a figure of 125,000 for the Rebel force. 34. Clark to Banks, Oct. 2, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 24.  The Confederates identified 175 regiments at Antietam in their casualty reports. 35. John Hay's anonymously written report, Sep. 30, 1862, as preserved in a newspaper clipping in the Hay collection, listed in Burlingame, Lincoln's Journalist, p. 315.  The postbattle returns from Lee's army were consistent with Clark's estimates after the battle casualties and many desertions are added back into the number. (OR, I, 19, pt. II: 621.) 36. Banks to Cullum, Oct. 15, 1862, OR, I, 19, pt. II: 432. 37. OR, I, 19, pt. II: 621--postbattle strength; Banks to Cullum, Oct. 20, 1862, OR, Ibid., 453. 38. OR, I, 19, pt. II: 452.

page 493 estimates in this period.   The new, low figures provided by Clark possibly became a major ingredient in the decision to replace McClellan on November 7.   Clark was also regularly conveying his findings to Secretary of State Seward during this period.39   If Lincoln put any stock in the Clark figures, they had the potential to change strategy because the president would now have some confirmation they were dealing with a much smaller Confederate army than McClellan portrayed to him.   Although Banks directed these reports of enemy strength to army superiors, he made reference to Clark's work in a letter to Lincoln several months later, intimating thereby that Lincoln was aware of it.40    It is also known that Lincoln was constantly seeking out war information during the conflict and that he was a daily visitor at Banks's headquarters.  Based on this, it is likely that Lincoln reviewed Clark's figures.  Lincoln did not, however, mandate that commanders use Clark's method of estimating enemy strength. McClellan's replacement, Major General Ambrose Burnside, would neglect prisoner interviews, cavalry reconnaissance, scouting and spying.   It would be January before active intelligence was revived by Burnside's replacement, Major General Joseph Hooker.  Before Burnside came to power and dismantled the intelligence apparatus, Banks and Clark had left Washington for a new assignment. The size of Banks's new command in Washington was impressive.  It was a much larger one than he had ever supervised.   The most men assigned during his stay were 107,839, a third of the Army of the Potomac.   There were also perhaps 600 artillery pieces in the fifty forts along the thrity-five-mile perimeter of the capital, many of them of the heaviest weight.41   The number of men present for duty varied widely, with units coming and going.  Within this total were some brand-new recruits undergoing training, three army field corps (Heintzelman, Porter and Sigel) and a permanent garrison.  The navy assisted by guarding the water approaches to the city.  On October 10, the general and Mrs. Banks inspected one of the navy's new monitors in Washington's navy yard.42 By order of the president, Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman had 39. Clark to William Seward, Aug. 16, 1862; Clark to Frederick Seward, Sep. 7, 1862, Franz Sigel to N. P. Banks [a copy of a reconnaissance report in handwriting of Banks's secretary], Oct. 2, 1862, William H. Seward papers, Rare Books and Special Collections, Univ. of Rochester Library, Microfilm .S485p, reels 71, 72. 40. Banks to Lincoln, Dec. 19, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 25. 41. OR, I, 19, pt II: 337. 42. Cole and McDonough, Benjamin Brown French: Witness to the Young Republic, A Yankee's Journal, 1828-1870, p. 412, entry of Oct. 10, 1862.

page 494 obtained command of much of Banks's forces south of the Potomac River.  This change did not meet with McClellan's approval, but Banks explained it was the president's decision.43   Heintzelman's corps also included the regiment in which Nathaniel's brother, Gardner, was an officer.  This arrangement may partially explain Gardner's rapid rise in rank in the fall. With the exception of his aides, Banks could not take his staff to Washington.  The war department had to agree anew to all staff appointments.   Because of the garrison nature of the location, he did not need a full staff.   An adjutant was essential, and McClellan agreed to the appointment of redheaded twenty-two-year-old Captain Richard Irwin as Banks's adjutant.  While on McClellan's staff, Irwin had hobnobbed with the likes of John Jacob Astor and the French princes who shadowed the commanding general.   Irwin would become the most prolific chronicler of the remainder of Banks's military career.44 Also within Banks's command was Brigadier General Daniel E. Sickles, one of the most colorful and controversial men of the nineteenth century.  Sickles's division was occupying the spot Banks corps had guarded during the Second Bull Run battle.45 One person who had no problem receiving Sickles was Abraham Lincoln's wife, Mary Todd Lincoln.  When in Washington, Sickles and his longtime friend, the flashy French chevalier Henry Wikoff, became regular guests at her séances in the Blue Room.   Lincoln had banned Wikoff from the White House for a while after he purloined a Lincoln document.  Despite Banks's connections with Wikoff and Sickles, Mary Banks and her husband failed to obtain invitations to Mary Lincoln's private events.  Mary Banks arrived in Washington in late September to join her husband.  "She [Mary Lincoln] did not like us.  We were too good," Mary recalled later.46   The best the Bankses could do this season was a cruise from New York City with Mary Lincoln and various officers on the U. S. S. North Carolina in October.47 Banks initially took up residence in Washington at Willard's Hotel before moving into Hooper's house.  This large hotel had been the site of the failed 43. OR, I, 19, pt. II: p 228. 44. Although Banks provided routine favors for Irwin's relatives after the war and Irwin lunched with him occasionally, Irwin's histories were relatively objective—though favorable to Banks. 45. It was Secretary of War Edwin Stanton before the war who obtained a "temporary insanity" verdict from a Washington jury in the trial that followed Sickles's assassination of his wife's lover.  Sickles himself had more lovers than biographers have been able to count, among whom was a queen of Spain.  Banks had likely met Sickles before the war, but it had been controversial before the war to associate with him.  Sickles's war service cleaned the slate, and he was back in society. 46. Mary T. Banks to N. P. Banks, Oct. 4, 1867, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box 3. 47. John S. Clark to N. P. Banks, Oct. 28, 1862, Ibid., box 24.

page 495 peace conference the previous year and had become the favorite temporary home of most Union generals ever since.  From there he wrote his wife that he had been depressed by brother Hiram's death.  This was counterbalanced by the reaction he found at the capital. "They cheered me on  the side walk at Willard's and  stopped all through  the  city as  I  passed...but I  felt  no  pride at  all.  Govr. Seward told me that I was the only general that had come out of the  war  so  far  without  a blemish and he said Genl. Halleck— who is  bitter  against  volunteer  officers  confessed  without that 'Banks' was a good general.  The  President  said so.  Mr. [John] Hay  told  me—his secretary—that  when  I  was in the field they never  wanted information.  The troops in my command since the Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  cheer me whenever I appear among them.  This  gives  me greater pleasure than all else because there is no humbug in them.  They don't cheer unless they like it...."48 The duties of garrison commander were more organizational than military.   A trained engineer took command of work on the forts and the evaluation of them.  The most vexing problem was the number of crimes perpetrated by drunken soldiers in downtown Washington.  The major work outside the city was sending out spies, scouts and cavalry reconnaissance parties.  Theoretically, Banks had one of the largest Union cavalry forces so far assembled, but only about 2,700 of the men had serviceable horses.49   Although the cavalrymen seemed to have been active in watching all the roads and passes down to the Rappahannock, Halleck commonly cautioned against anything offensive.   For Halleck, Banks's infantry were to be "camps of observation," and there were to be no such things as "reconnaissances in force."    The two corps south of Washington could have easily wrecked havoc in the Confederate rear areas if someone less risk-aversive than Halleck had been guiding operations. Irwin credited Banks with establishing picket lines around Washington—these having disappeared during the Bull Run debacle.  Within two days, the Massachusetts general also restored discipline to the garrison units and got rid of the large number of stragglers in Washington by 48. N. P. Banks to Mary T. Banks, Sep. 4, 1862, N. P. Banks papers, LOC, box  6.  The crowds tended to cheer important generals when they went in public in the North during the war.  Grant and Sherman, for example, experienced similar celebrity welcomes.  The cheering of deposed General McClellan is mentioned elsewhere in this book.  Even the hapless William Rosecrans was cheered in Cincinnati after his firing at Chattanooga in 1863. (New York Herald, Oct. 26, 1863.) 49. OR, I, 19, pt II: 350.

page 496 withholding the rations of unreported men.  At Banks's headquarters, President Lincoln dropped in frequently for news.   Banks kept Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck and McClellan "constantly and fully advised of everything, and managed by his tact, good judgment, and experience to retain the confidence of his superiors, without which, in the remarkable state of feeling and of faction then prevailing, no one could have done anything," according to Banks's admiring adjutant.50 The records do not indicate that Banks obtained any news for Lincoln that the curious president himself was unable to wheedle out of McClellan.  Irwin in September had written McClellan's adjutant as follows: "It  seems to be expected  that we shall  know about  you and I think the magnates gather an impression that nothing is being done because they hear nothing."51 Take the suggestion for what it is worth, said Irwin.  Apparently it was not worth much.   The communications directly from McClellan's headquarters to Banks or Irwin were mostly orders to relocate various regiments to new sites.   All the strategic and tactical information went straight to General Halleck, Secretary Stanton or President Lincoln. During the frenzied period prior to the battle at Antietam, young Richard Irwin seemed to have handled much of the arranging of troop movements while Banks concentrated on forts, pickets and cavalry reconnaissance.  After the battle ended, Banks became more involved. If one observer is to be believed, Banks had become disgusted with his situation and with General McClellan.  "He does not propose to be sacrificed in the War office to the fact that we have no discipline, no soldiers, no generals," Colonel William Dwight wrote to his father.  William was the second Dwight brother now under Banks's command, Wilder having recently died of wounds at Antietam.52    The replacement Dwight would be with Banks for most of two years. 50. Irwin, "Washington under Banks," in Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, pp. 541-44. 51. Irwin to Seth Williams, Sep. 10, 1863, Natl. Archives, RG 393 pt. 1 entry 5379, Defenses of Washington, Telegrams Received. 52. William Dwight Jr. to his father, Oct. 28, 1862, Dwight family papers, 1815-1942, Mass. Historical Society.  Dwight had good sources at the time.  Banks was staying with a Dwight family friend, Samuel Hooper, and Dwight was staying with General Joseph Hooker.  William was waiting for a formal prisoner exchange to go back on duty.

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